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This paper compares cooperation among Columbian and Swedish children aged 9-12. We 
illustrate the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma in a new task that is easily understood by 
children and performed during a physical education class. We find some evidence that 
children cooperate more in Sweden than in Colombia. Girls in Colombia are less cooperative 
than boys, whereas our results indicate the opposite gender gap in Sweden. On average, 
children are more cooperative with boys than with girls.  
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1. Introduction 
The possibility to overcome social dilemmas through cooperation plays an important role in 
many everyday situations such as the provision of public goods, the use of common-pool 
resources and the sustainment of social norms. Cooperation varies substantially among 
individuals and across contexts (e.g. Cárdenas and Carpenter 2008, Martinsson et al. 2009, 
Gächter et al. 2010), yet relatively little is known about the formation of preferences for 
cooperation. Understanding the foundations of cooperative preferences, how it develops with 
age, and differs across cultures and genders, is therefore an important topic. Experiments on 
children in different countries are one way to increase this understanding.  
In this paper we study gender differences in cooperation among more than 800 children aged 
approximately 9-12 in Colombia and Sweden. We introduce a novel version of a prisoner’s 
dilemma that can be implemented in a physical education (P.E.) class. In this task, children 
are randomly paired, and decide in private how to divide a total of 10 balls between a private 
bin that gives three individual points for each ball and a public bin that gives two points per 
ball to each child. The balls are placed in the middle, and each pair of bins are placed jointly 
and in opposite directions from the balls. The children are then given two minutes to fetch the 
balls one by one and make their decisions on how to allocate the balls. Cooperation is 
measured by the number of balls placed in the public bin. 
We find evidence of children in Colombia being less cooperative than children in Sweden, 
due to a significant difference in cooperation between girls from the two countries. No 
difference in cooperation is found comparing boys in the two countries. Within countries, we 
find that girls in Colombia are less cooperative than boys, whereas our results suggest the 
opposite in Sweden. We also find some impact of the gender of the opponent; children are 
more cooperative with boys than with girls. These results suggest that it is important to not 
generalize results from only one country when exploring gender differences in economic 
behaviors such as cooperation. 
Earlier results on gender differences in cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma among adults 
are mixed, with some studies finding that men are more cooperative, some studies finding that 
women are more cooperative, and some studies finding no gender difference (see Croson and 
Gneezy 2009 for a review). A few studies aim to understand this variation further. Charness 
and Rustichini (2011) explore to what extent gender differences in cooperative behaviors are 
influenced by context, by having subjects in a prisoner’s dilemma make their decision 2 
 
whether to cooperate or defect while being observed by in-group members or out-group 
members. While men cooperate less when observed by their in-group compared to their 
outgroup, women behave in the opposite way. Boschini et al. (2011) study a modified 
prisoner’s dilemma and find that men in an all-male context are less likely to punish deviators 
from a cooperation norm compared to both men in a gender-mixed context and to women in 
either type of context. Together these studies suggest that more attention has to be paid to the 
contexts and perhaps gender-related social expectations in social dilemma games in order to 
systematically investigate gender differences in cooperation. 
Among children, gender differences in cooperation remain largely unexplored: In the two 
studies that we are aware of, Harbaugh and Krause (2000) find no gender differences in a 
sample of 6-12 year old American children, whereas Tedeschi et al. (1969) find that girls in 
another sample of American children are more cooperative than boys.
1 This study aims to 
contribute to this relatively small literature by comparing the gender gap in cooperation 
among children in two countries that vary substantially in gender equality: Sweden typically 
places in the top on macroeconomic indices pertaining to gender equality whereas Colombia 
places substantially lower (e.g. Hausmann et al. 2010).  
In a previous paper (Cárdenas et al. in press) we explored whether the gender gap in 
competitiveness and risk preferences differs systematically between Colombia and Sweden. 
Given previous results on the gender gap in competitiveness across cultures and contexts, we 
expected boys to be more competitive than girls in Colombia, with a smaller if any gender gap 
at all in Sweden. However, we found no evidence of a gender gap in competitiveness in 
Colombia, whereas the results in Sweden were mixed depending on the task performed and 
the type of competitiveness measure. We also reported a larger gender gap in risk taking in 
Colombia compared to Sweden, with boys being more risk taking than girls in both countries. 
It is not obvious how these results should translate to gender gaps in cooperation in Colombia 
and Sweden, and previous literature on the topic is largely silent when it comes to making 
predictions about this. Thus, the current paper remains largely explorative. 
The outline of our paper is the following. In section 2, we present the experimental setup. We 
present our results in section 3, and finish with a discussion in section 4. 
 
                                                            
1 In two other experiments that we are aware of on cooperation as measured by either a prisoner’s dilemma or a 
public goods game among children, gender differences are not explored (Peters et al. 2004, Sally and Hill 2006). 3 
 
2. Experimental setup 
The experiment consisted of two parts: a P.E. class part followed by a classroom part either 
the same day or the same week. Both parts of the study were overseen by at least one teacher 
and two experimenters. The focus of this paper is the cooperation task, which was performed 
only in the P.E. part. In this part, the children participated in a cooperation task, as well as 
competed in running and skipping rope (competitiveness is explored in Cárdenas et al. in 
press). The cooperation task was performed before the children were aware of the competitive 
elements of running and skipping rope.  
The cooperation task had the form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game where each player made 10 
subsequent allocation choices (this game can thus easily be transformed into a public goods 
game with more than two players). The units allocated were balls and cooperation and 
defection were represented by two different physical bins, called the public bin and the private 
bin, both placed within one, larger basket. Two separate baskets were placed seven meters in 
opposite directions from a pool of ten green balls and ten white balls. Children were randomly 
paired (the opponent was unknown until the task started), assigned a basket and a color, and 
given two minutes to fetch the balls, one at a time, and place it either in the public or private 
bin.
2 Each ball in the private bin gave three private points, whereas each ball in the public bin 
gave two points per child. The children were told that each ball was a choice and that they 
could place each ball in any of the two bins. 
Even though other children were present while the task was performed, measures were taken 
in order to ensure that the children made their actual choices largely in private; other children 
were prevented from watching ball placements. The total number of points earned was 
announced at the end of the PE part, when points were converted into attractive pens, markers 
and erasers. The children were informed about the set up in the beginning of the class, 
including that more points correspond to more prizes.
3 Our measure of cooperation is the 
number of balls placed in the public bin. 
 
                                                            
2 If the class consisted of an odd number of children one child was randomly chosen to participate twice. In this 
case only the first participation of that child is used in the analysis. All children finished the task within the time 
limit of two minutes. The timing was introduced in order to make sure the children exercised as part of the P.E. 
class. 
3 Given that the children were aware of the setup and could potentially infer the behavior of the other child from 




In this section we test whether there is a gender gap in cooperation among children in 
Colombia and Sweden, within as well as between the countries. The analysis is based on how 
many units (balls) between 0 and 10 that were placed in the public bin. For the tests in this 
analysis we have performed a Mann-Whitney tests as well as a two-sided t-test. Throughout 
the analysis we present only the p-value for the Mann-Whitney test unless the two tests vary 
in terms of significance, in which case both p-values are reported.
4 In order to test whether the 
size of the gender gap differs between Colombia and Sweden we conduct a regression 
analysis.
5 
3.1 Basic statistics 
A total of 1240 children (50% girls, 631 participants in Colombia and 609 in Sweden) 
predominantly aged 9-12 participated in the study during the academic year 2009-2010.
6 
Table 1 provides summary statistics pertaining to our sample in this paper (Appendix Table 
A1 provides variable descriptions). While there likely is some selection among schools that 
participated, no self-selection among the children occurred since all children present in school 
on the day that the study took place participated. Among the participating classes, a 
subsample of classes was randomly picked such that in the cooperation task 459 children 
participated in Colombia and 364 in Sweden. 
Table 1. Summary statistics                
Variable Mean  Sd  Median  N  Min  Max 
Age  10.89 0.93  11  758  8  15
† 
Gender (boy=0, girl=1)*  0.51 0.50  1  808  0  1 
Country (Sweden=1, 
Colombia=0) 
0.44 0.50  0  823  0  1 
Contribution to PD  4.11 4.16  3  823  0  10 
* For 15 children we were not able to determine the gender. 
†There is one child who is 15 years old, two who are 14 years old, 20 who are 13 years old, and three who are 8 
years old. Age per se is however not the focus of the paper. 
 
                                                            
4 We present the Mann-Whitney test since none of our variables are normally distributed when using a skewness 
and kurtosis test.  
5 The regression analysis is based on parametric assumptions that may not be fulfilled. We compare the results 
from regressions with no controls with controls for age and risk preferences, using both OLS and a Tobit 
regression (Lower limit= 0 and upper limit=10). 
6 The data for Sweden was collected in parallel to the data collection in Colombia, hence the Swedish sample is 
not the same as in Dreber et al. (2011). The sample is however the same as in Cárdenas et al. (in press). 5 
 
3.2 Overall results 
Of the 10 units available the participating children allocated on average 4.11 units to the 
public bin. In point estimates, Colombian children cooperated somewhat less (4.0 units) than 
Swedish children (4.3 units). However, this difference is only marginally significant 
(p=0.0825, see table 2).
7 The Colombian distribution is further more extreme than the 
Swedish one, with a larger proportion of children cooperating fully or not at all.
8  
3.3 Gender differences within countries 
We find no significant difference in average cooperation between boys (4.2 units) and girls 
(4.0 units) (p=0.5911). Some gender differences appear, however, within each country. In 
Colombia girls cooperate significantly less than boys do (p=0.0291). In Sweden, we find an 
indication of the opposite, with girls cooperating more than boys (p=0.0664).
9 Hence, the 
point estimate in Sweden goes in the opposite direction to the one in Colombia. Table 2 
displays average cooperation for each country by gender. 
Table 2. Average cooperation 
Country\Gender All  Boys Girls  p-value 
All  4.11 4.24 3.99  0.5911 
Colombia  4.00 4.46 3.54  0.0291 
Sweden  4.25 3.98 4.55  0.0664 
p-value  0.0825 0.4426 0.0006    - 
 
3.4 Gender differences between countries 
Comparing the difference in how children behave across countries, we find some difference 
between Colombia and Sweden.
10 This difference is driven by the gap in cooperation between 
Colombian and Swedish girls. As can be seen in table 2 above, Colombian girls cooperate the 
                                                            
7 With a t-test, however, this is not significant (p=0.3828).  
8 Similarity of the distributions is rejected using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p=0.003). 
9 This is not significant with a t-test (p=0.164). 
10 The regressions give marginally significant p-values of the interaction between country and gender, which 
remain when controlling for risk preferences and age using Tobit whereas it disappears using OLS specification. 
Age correlates positively and significantly with cooperation, whereas risk preferences do not. Throughout, our 
results are qualitatively similar when we control for school affiliation. As reported in Cárdenas et al. (in press), 
there are also gender differences in risk taking in the pooled data (p<0.001). The change in estimates, due to 
specification, could also be caused by randomness or differences in distributions since we have a truncated 
dependent variable. For further information see Appendix table A2.  6 
 
least and Swedish girls the most, and these groups differ significantly (p=0.0006). Boys in the 
two countries behave similarly (p=0.4426).
11  
3.5 Gender of the opponent 
Previous literature has also looked at gender interactions in behavior (see Croson and Gneezy 
2009 for a review of this literature). We find that average cooperation when a child in the full 
sample faces a boy compared to a girl is 4.45 and 3.80 units respectively (p=0.0125). 
Separating the sample by gender, the effect is significant among girls (p=0.0395) and there is 
also evidence of an effect among boys (p=0.0837).
12 However, analyzing boys and girls in 
each country separately, we find no significant effect of the gender of the opponent in any 
group (see table 3).
13  
Table 3. Average cooperation based on gender of opponent* 
N  Average number of units 
Boys   Girls  Difference  p-value 
Colombia  219/239 4.41  3.63  0.78  0.0543 
Boys vs.   115/103 4.69  4.20  0.49  0.2089 
Girls vs.  99/127 4.17  3.06 1.11 0.1416 
Sweden  182/179 4.51  4.03  0.48  0.1374 
Boys vs.   82/97 4.30  3.78 0.52  0.2331 
Girls vs.  100/81 4.67  4.38 0.29 0.5128 
*We lack information about the gender of the opponent for four participants. 
 
4. Discussion 
In this paper we have introduced a new measurement of cooperation. It illustrates the 
dynamics of the prisoners’ dilemma and the public goods games and is easily understandable, 
and therefore suitable for running experiments on children. Moreover, this measure can be 
implemented during a P.E. class and does not require elaborate resources. Therefore, it is easy 
to use in a wide range of settings, with different age groups. In particular, it is useful in 
studies like the one performed in this paper where we study two different countries. This 
explorative study compares children from quite different societies in terms of culture 
(including gender norms) and socio-economic backgrounds. Moreover, the cooperation task 
involves both a physical component associated with the effort of running to collect the balls 
                                                            
11 Similarly, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates different distributions among girls across countries (p<0.001), 
but not among boys (p=0.229) 
12 For boys this is not significant with a t-test (p=0.219). 
13 Among girls in Colombia, the difference is significant with a t-test  (p=0.050). 7 
 
and the decision task whether to cooperate or not. The combination of effort and payoff 
structure provides a realistic task illustrating the prisoner’s dilemma to the children. 
Little is known about gender differences in cooperation among children. We find that girls are 
less cooperative than boys in Colombia whereas the opposite relationship appears to be the 
case in Sweden. These results should however be interpreted with caution since they often 
depend on test specification, possibly caused by the differences in distributions. Our results 
thus indicate that gender differences in cooperation may differ across countries, and that it is 
important to systematically study gender differences in behavior in different countries or 
contexts in order to draw general conclusions about gender difference. This is also supported 
by a study on adults, which finds higher cooperation in a matrilineal society compared to two 
patriarchal societies in India (Andersen et al. 2008). Interestingly, and unlike what we find 
among children, they find that this difference across societies among adults is mainly due to a 
difference in how men behave.  
We are unaware of other studies exploring gender differences in cooperation among children 
in different countries. A relevant study on social preferences is Martinsson et al. (2011), who 
measure social preferences using modified dictator games in a sample of Swedish and 
Austrian children aged 10-15 years old. Boys are found to be more efficiency concerned and 
girls more inequality averse, and Swedish children are more social-welfare oriented and less 
difference averse than Austrian children. A natural extension of our paper would be to use our 
cooperation setup and also measure social preferences as in e.g. Martinsson et al. (2011). 
Exploring behavior in different contexts is important for understanding the determinants of 
the gender gap in preferences. Moreover, studies on children can increase our understanding 
of how preferences develop over age, and how children’s behavior compares to that of adults. 
Future research should expand this type of work by comparing different age groups and 
countries, while at the same time systematically varying key features of the context in order to 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Set of variables used, variable description 
Sweden (Colombia=0, Sweden=1)  Dummy variable for country 
Female(Boy=0, Girl=1)  Dummy variable for gender 
Female*Sweden  Interaction variable between gender and country 
Cooperation  Continuous measure of cooperation 
Age  Age measured in years 
Risk  Risk preferences from the incentivized lotteries 
(see Cárdenas et al. forthcoming) 
 
 
Table A2. Cooperation regressions 





Female  -0.642 -1.527  -0.565  -1.358 
  (0.440) (1.086)  (0.449)  (1.102) 
Sweden  -0.108 0.0405  -0.173 -0.0935 
  (0.453) (1.067)  (0.450)  (1.060) 
Female*Sweden  1.059* 2.678*  0.979  2.472* 
  (0.613) (1.449)  (0.612)  (1.443) 
Age     0.401**  1.102*** 
     (0.170)  (0.406) 
Risk     0.0407  0.0457 
     (0.0983)  (0.245) 
Constant  4.194*** 3.250***  -0.278  -8.867* 
  (0.323) (0.774)  (1.907)  (4.584) 
Observations  712 712  712  712 
R
2/Pseudo R
2  0.007 0.003  0.016  0.005 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
§ We here use the lower limit set to 0 and the upper limit set to 10 
 